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LEGISLATIVE FACILITATION O F  GOVERNMENT GROWTH: 
UNIVERSALISM AND RECIPROCITY PRACTICES IN MAJORITY RULE INSTITUTIONS 
Morris P .  Fiorina 
I .  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Majority Rule , Universalism , and Reciprocity 
Theorists generally agree that majority rule institut ions 
do not provide an economically optimal supply of public goods . They 
find less agreement , however, on the nature of the departure from 
optimality . Anthony Downs (1957 , 1960) argues that democratic  
governments typically do "too litt le , "  a claim which follows 
primarily from his focus on informational imperfections in real 
world political processes .1 In contrast , B uchanan and Tullock (19 6 2 )  
contend that d emocratic  governments do "too much . "  Their models 
presume p er fect information and exploit the d ivergence between 
benefits and costs characteristic o f  many public programs . 
More recent research suggests t hat questions of whether 
majority rule institutions do too little or too much are fundamentally 
unanswerable . Not only is majority rule generally indeterminate 
(Plott , 1967 ) , b ut in the absence o f  equilibrium literally any 
2 
outcome is p ossible (McKelv ey , 1976; Scho field , 197 6 ) . Thus , while 
one can say that maj ority rule is inefficient (by v irtue of its 
2 
indeterminacy) ,  it does not appear that one can address the charac-
teristics of the inefficiency . 
Given the preceding background the obv ious question is 
whether one can say anything about legislative stimuli for public 
sector growth . Fortunately , the answer is yes , and the reason is 
that purported maj ority rule institutions o ft en do not funct ion as 
theory might lead us to expect . Democratic assemblies are a prime 
case: while it is formally correct to r efer to them as maj ority 
rule institut ions , it is emp irically misleading to take that 
chracterization too seriously . I am not referring merely to the 
decentralization o ften found in such bodies . Theoretically majority 
rule still holds at each stage . In the U . S .  House of Representat ives , 
for example , a subcommittee majority can report a b ill t o  the full 
committee , a majority o f  which may modify it and r eport it to the 
floor (usually v ia a maj ority of the Rules Committee) where a 
majority can again modify it and send it to the Conference (an 
interesting sub-institution wherein a major ity of each chamb er ' s  
conferees must approve the compromise which will b e  reported back 
to their respective chamber s ) . I am referring instead to the fact that 
even at the separate stages o f  a decentralized legislative process 
scholars hav e identified p atterns seemingly inconsistent with 
notions of maj ority decision . Two such p atterns which deserve 
the attention of this conference ar e univers alism and reciprocity . 
Universalism is synonymous with the phrase "something for 
everyone . "  In Congress we usually do not find bare maj orities 
carrying a decision -- minimal winning coalitions exploiting maximal 
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losing ones . Ins tead we find floor coalitions of ex traord inary 
size and sometimes virtually unanimous commit tees . The traditional 
pork barrel b ills are the clas sic cas e .  According to Ferejohn 
(1974) the typical public works omnibus b ill contains something 
for 350-400 congressional d is tricts . The recent "Park Barrel" bil l  
was es timated to have a direct effect o n  more than 260 d is tricts , 
as well as spillovers into neighboring districts (LA Times , 
Congress ional Record , June 2 6 ,  197 8 ,  H6059-H607 3) . 
Reciprocity is the expectation that concerned or o ther­
wise involved minorities should have their way . At the commit tee 
or subcommittee level reciprocity requires a policy of mu tual 
noninterference if no t mu tual support . Among individuals reciprocity 
demands at a minimum that memb ers not oppose colleagues' proposals 
which have no s ignificant impact on theit own dis tricts . 
The ex is tence of universalism and reciprocity has b een 
recognized in the empirical literature for qu ite some time . Matthews 
(19 60 ) addressed both in his classic account o f  the early postwar 
Senate , though he failed to make a clear distinction between the 
two . Fenno (19 62)  contains an excellent discussion of reciprocity 
in the Appropriations process . Ferej ohn's (1974) discus sion of 
the Public Works process implies that reciprocity is widespread. 
Mayhew (1974) contains the mos t  thorough d is cussion of universalism 
as well as references to a far-flung empirical literature . Jus t  
what universalism and reciprocity are i s  less certain . The earlier 
writers (Matthews and Fenno) regard them as real ( though sub j ective) 
phenomena : internalized norms which constrain memb ers ' b ehavior. 
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Later au thors ( e .g . Mayhew) regard universalism and reciprocity as 
reflections of (at leas t tacit )  agreements entered into by u tility­
maximizing legislators . Weingast (1978) in fact formali zes such 
a view of universalism , I will no t dwell on the dis tinction here,  
excep t to note the obvious fact that what we think universalism and 
reciprocity are depends on� we think they ex is t ,  a mat ter I'll 
return to b elow . For the moment let us characterize universalism 
and reciprocity as "practices" or "arrangements"; these terms 
fall somewhere between "norms" and "agreements . "  
The implication of universal ism for government growth is 
obviou s , that for reciprocity somewhat less so. Though we may not 
be able to say mu ch abou t the ou tcome of pure maj ority rule , the 
situation is no t so wide-open when we cons ider maj ority rule trans­
formed by universalism. Take any particu lar government activity . 
Maj ority rule s tates that the leg is lature might undertake tha t  
activity at some level i n  anywhere from 0-4 35 congressional 
districts. Traditional economic theory s tates that the leg islature 
should undertake that activity at some level in somewhere b etween 
0 and 4 35 d is tricts . UniversaliS111 implies that the leg islature 
will undertake that activity at some level in all or nearly all 
435 d is tricts . The odds are very high that maj ority rul e  as 
modified by universalism will depart from efficiency in the 
d irection o f  over-produ ction of public goods and services, or in 
short , economically ex cessive government activity . And indeed , 
some observers consider many public sector activities associated 
with universalism to be economically unjustified even in the very 
weak sense of unitary cos t-b enefit ratios (Ferej ohn , 1974 ) .  
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Reciprocity often wi ll stimulate gov ernment growth , but it 
does not do so unaided . It is commonly argued that the committees 
which are the primary benefi ciaries of reciprocity are systematically 
unrepresentative of the parent body . Specifically , they are domi-
nated by members who have high demand for the activities within the 
committee ' s  jurisdiction (Niskanen , 1971 ) . Examples from recent 
history are common.  The Interior Committees have been the domain 
of representatives from economically undeveloped districts 
(usually in the West) who worked to obtain national subsidization 
for their d evelopment efforts . The Agriculture Committees have 
been run by representatives who sought national subsidies f�r 
particular agri cultural sectors . The Banking Committees have 
attracted representatives from u rban areas who favored national 
subsidi zation of housing , urban renewal , etc .  B y  allowing such 
committees a relatively free hand, reciprocity almost certainly 
produces excessiv e government involvement in a given area . What­
ever the optimal level of an activity ,  it is doubtful that it will 
consistently b e  near the maximum demand for that activit� which is 
what reciprocity tends to produce . 
As I indi cated , there are exceptions to the preceding 
account of the workings of reciprocity . Take the Judi ciary Committees 
during the 1950s and 60s . These committees attracted both the high 
d emand group (Northern liberal Democrats with B lack constituents ) 
and the low demand group ( Southern Democrats from racist district s ) . 
Each had an equally direct stake in Civil Rights legislation . A 
p riori , one cannot s ay that reciprocity would produce greater govern­
ment involv ement in such a context . And in fact , it is in just such 
contexts that we do not observe reciprocity . Rather,  reciprocity is 
associ ated with committees whose members have a direct , compatible 
interest in the committee's jurisdiction especially where nonmembers 
have only an amorphous taxpayer interest . 
Solll_�Finer___Q:!:stinctions 
The preceding discussion of reciprocity hints at several 
di sctinctions it will be u seful to recognize befo re moving on, It 
may clarify matters to consider di fferences among types of public 
policies and associated di fferences among kinds of gov ernment growth . 
Lowi (19 64 ) has t ri ed to specify the outlines of three 
differing policy arenas .
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The first , distributive politics , refers 
to the classic case of particularized benefits and generalized 
costs . W at er proj ects, federal buildings, urban renewal proj ects , 
research grant s ,  neighborhood health centers , etc .  are examples, 
as are traditional industry speci fi c  t ari ffs . The second arena Lowi 
terms regulatory politics . In this arena policy proscribes or 
commands specific actions on the part of individu als and firms . 
Such constraints supposedly produce general benefits (i . e .  in the 
pub li c interest) and impose general costs . The third arena is that 
of redistributive politics . All economists and many politi cal 
scientists have trouble with this one : distributive and regulatory 
activities almost certainly have redistributive implications . Lowi 
appears to distinguish distributive from redistributive in t erms o f  
the scale of t h e  effo rt . Redistributive involves shifts from 
capital to labor or at least richer to poorer . White to Black or 
young to old might also q ualify . Large scale reallocations of 
resources across demographic or income categories would seem to 
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define redis tributive , whereas smaller scale reallocations across 
geographic categories appear to d efine distributive .4 
Imperfectly associated with Lowi ' s  three policy arenas 
are three types of government growth which I will label size , 
intrusiveness , and scope . S ize is the traditional concept o f  
government growth . How many government employees are there? How 
big is their payroll? Wha t por tion o f  GNP is accounted for 
by government? Intrusiveness refers to the degree that government 
policy d iminishes individual freedom of action.  Assuming zero 
enforcement costs  an increase in the intrusiveness of government 
would not necessitate an increase in size,  but given the error of that 
assumption growth along the two d imensions will be pos itively 
correlated . Finally , scope refers s imply to the different spheres 
in which the government is involved . Again, an expansion in s cope 
will necessarily entail an expansion in size , but scope and 
intrusiveness are less closely related . 
I suggest that an increase in government activity in some 
distributive policy area necessarily entails only an expansion in 
government size . If we build more d ams , we pay higher construction 
and operating cos ts . Redis tributive policy , in contras t ,  necessarily 
entails only an increase in the intrusiveness of government: those 
red is tr ibuted from have less freedom that b efore . 5 But note that a 
shift from a flat or proportional income tax to a progressive one need 
no t require an increase in the size of the revenue colle ction agency 
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(assuming no increase in cheating as a result of the change ) . The 
ins truments we choose to effect red is tribution do entail growth in 
government size , but  in principle they need no t . 6 Regulatory policy , 
finally , involves both the obvious increase in the intrus iveness o f  
government and an increase i n  the sheer economic weight o f  the 
regulatory apparatus . Consider l and use planning,  drug regulation , 
auto safety regulation,  etc . 
An expansion in government scope , of course ,  can occur 
in any of the three policy arenas . In the d is tributive arena we 
can ( and have) proceeded from water proj ects to urban renewal 
proj ects to local health , counseling and training proj ects . In the 
redistributive arena one could imagine a progression from a tax on 
personal earned income all the way to a general tax on wealth . 
And in the regulatory arena we have seen a steady expansion from 
regulation for the p ublic health and safety to commercial practices 
to product quality to employment and organizational memb ership 
decisions and almost  to the proscription of father-son and mother­
daughter social functions . 
To return to the main lines of our dis cussion universalism 
and reciprocity are usually associated with the d is tributive arena and 
for reasons to be mentioned later , the older regulatory arena . The 
great legislative bat tles in which a narrow, carefully construc ted 
legis la tive maj ority triumphs over a large , intense maj ority 
generally center around policies which fall in the regulatory or 
redis tributive categories . Examples include Full Employment 
(Bailey , 1950 ) , Fed eral Aid to Education (Eidenberg and Morey , 
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1969 ) , Civil  Rights (Wolfinger , forthcoming) , and Medic ar e  (Marmor , 
1973 ) .  Indeed , committees such as House Education and Labor whose 
workload inc ludes a high proportion of proposed r edistr ibutive 
legis lation have drawn scholarly attention in large part because 
of their apparent failure to follow universalism and reciproc ity 
prac t ices ( e . g .  Fenno , 19 71) . 
Thus , in focusing on universalism and reciprocity we 
implic itly focus on d is tr ibutiv e  policy , and based on my earlier 
argument s ,  the size dimension of government growth . 
Two Possible Bases for Universalism and Reciprocity 
Earlier I referred to different conc ep t ions of the natur e  
of universalism and reciprocity . These differing conceptions of what 
universalism and reciprocity are correspond to different conceptions 
of why they exis t . The older conception ( internali zed norms) is 
roo ted in the notion of the legislature as a sociological ins titution . 
Legislators are members of a collec t ivity which has a task to 
accomplish ( i . e .  a " func tion" to perform) . A subcomm it tee should 
draft an appropriations b il l ,  a full committee should defend its 
produc t  on the floor , a chamber should approve effec t iv e  laws etc . 
Univ ersalism and r ec iproc ity facilitate the p erformance of such 
func tions . Universalism minimzes sources o f  petty b ickering 
(nobody gets left out) . Reciprocity buttresses the Committee­
seniority-exper tise sys tem (Fenno , 1966) . To elaborate , complexity 
and s ize  of workload have forced the modern legis lature to implement 
a d ivision of labor--the committee sys tem. Seniori ty ensures that 
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exper ienced ( i . e .  expert? ) members chair committees . Reciproc ity 
provides the incentiv e  which makes the system work . If uninvolved 
and uninformed memb ers felt free to upset the c areful work of the 
commi ttees , the latter would have little incentive to specialize 
in their p ar t icular j urisdic tions , and the over all quality o f  
legislation would suffer . The following delightful exchange from 
the recent debate on the "Park B arrel" b ill illus tr ates this older , 
policy-neutral view of internal legislative arrangements : 
Mr . Skubitz  ( R . , Kansas) (Ranking Republican , House Inter­
ior Committee) : 
Mr . Chairman , I would like to ask the chairman 
of the subcommittee a question . In the opinion 
of the subcommittee , does the gentleman no t think 
that if 95 to 98 percent of the projects we have here 
were brought out in the old process of having 
them one at a time , that they would all be 
passed by this body anyway? 
Mr . Bur ton (D. , California) ( Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Parks and Territor ies) : 
Mr . Chairman , if the gentleman will yield , absolutely . 
Mr . Skubitz : 
What we tried to do was to lump them all together so 
that this b ody might ac t once in a few hours r ather 
than spend d ays and weeks on these proj ec ts .  
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Hr. Burton: 
The gentleman is absolutely correct.· 
--(Congressional Record, June 26, 1978, H6061) 
The newer conception of universalism and reciprocity (more 
or less conscious agreements) rests on the more cynical assumption 
that legislators seek individual goals, chiefly reelection, primarily 
and collective goals secondarily, if at all. The probability of 
reelection is enhanced by the procurement of projects for the dis-
trict, a task which is easier under universalism than majority rule 
(Mayhew, Weingast), and also by the appearance of "clout" produced 
by reciprocity. Hence universalism and reciprocity are voluntary 
(if tacit) agreements by legislators whose primary goal is to remain 
legislators. 
The older view of the specific effects of universalism and 
reciprocity is widely accepted, and in my opinion largely valid. But 
many of us have come to doubt that minimizing individual unhappiness 
and buttressing the Committee-seniority-expertise system necessarily, 
or even usually produces high quality legislation. Rather, those 
effects of universalism and reciprocity serve. a different purpose---
the individual goals of the members as supposed in the newer-wiew. 
The raison d'etre of universalism and reciprocity is not so much to 
facilitate the work of a majority rule institution as to alter the 
pattern of outcomes from that which legislators might expect a 
majority rule institution to produce. 
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This paper focuses on the newer conception of universalism 
and reciprocity, a controversial conception, and one which as yet is 
purely theory rather than fact (purely speculation rather than theory 
in the case of reciprocity). Why do we observe patterns seemingly 
indicative of universalism and reciprocity? What model(s) of 
individual goal-seeking behavior predicts such observations? We 
will begin by considering the properties of simple majority rule 
in the distributive arena, both as background for those unfamiliar 
with the theoretical results and as a check on the common opposition 
that universalism,. reciprocity, or both are inconsistent with simple 
majority rule. 
II. DISTRIBUTIVE POLICY-MAKING: ON THE TRAIL OF UNIVERSALISM
Notation, Definitions, Assumptions 
We begin with a set L = {Q.1, . . . ,Q,R_}' of legislators,
When a set W ,  lw I = w > � of legislators supports a proposal
we call W a winning coalition, and if I WI = i + 1 ( Q, even) or 
Q, +  1 �2� (Q, odd), we term W a minimal winning coalition and signify it
by M, IMI = m. 
Assume that each Q,i wishes the legislature to authorize a 
project with benefits, bi � 0 and costs, ci > O. These proposals 
are not the outcome of a strategic calculation but arise naturally 
from the preferences of constituents. 
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Secondly, assume that each district is assigned a tax 
share, ti > 0, prior to the decisionmaking, i. e. ti is constant and 
exogeneous to the project authorization process. Given that we are 
in the realm of distributive politics bi accrues exclusively to the 
constituents of Q,i whereas ci is borne by the districts of all Jlj 
!l 
in proportion t,c,. 
J l 
The budget is balanced: l, t,c.= c,l/c,. 
j=l J ]_ l ]_ 
Assume thirdly that legislators are primarily interested 
in reelection and that constituents support legislators on the basis 
of the net benefits of legislative decisions to the districts. In 
short, Jli seeks to maximize 
b. - ti I C, 
1 jEP J 
where P is the set of approved 
projects 
Jli will carry out this maximization by (1), seeking to get legis­
lative approval for his project, (2) working against the approval 
of all other projects, or more generally, working to minimize the 
total cost of all projects authorized. Clearly, Jli will only pro­
pose his project if bi.'."._ tici. We assume this always holds. 
All projects can be arrayed along a costliness dimension: 
(1) 
cheapest median 
most. expensive 
cl C, ]_ c m c s 
Projects more costly than the median will be termed expensive; all 
other projects will be termed cheap. 
Finally, the minimal winning coalition composed of 
legislators Jl.1 to !lm (projects c1 to cm) is called the cheapest 
minimal winning coalition, and denoted by Mc. 
Distributive Politics Under Unconstrained Majority Rule 
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If the projects of individual Jli are considered sequentially 
(i. e. separately) all projects fail by votes of Jl - 1:1 because each 
legislator maximize net benefits to his district by voting against 
all projects but his own. The series of projects constitutes a 
succession of binary (aye-nay) decisions, and since majority rule 
is well-behaved on two element sets, this case presents no ambiguity. 
The unique majority rule outcome is the disapproval of all projects 
which we will signify by Z ,  the zero project outcome. 
Tullock (1970), Weingast (1978) and others contend that 
legislatures will escape the no project outcome by communicating and 
forming logrolling coalitions which will result in the approval of 
w projects, one for each member of the coalition. Thus, the 
meaning of a proposal now shifts from a single project to an omnibus, 
an !!.-vector of ones and zeroes where ones identify the legislators 
who receive projects. It is now well-known, however, that such 
processes are notoriously unstable. The operative theorem in this 
case is that of Kadane (1972). 
In the terminology I have introduced, Kadane shows that if 
legislators have separable, single-peaked preferences over each of 
a series of policy choices (e.g. proposals), then either Z is the 
equilibrium of the logrolling process, or the latter has no equili-
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7 brium and Z is an element of the top cycle. Thus, if the logrolling 
process yields a stable outcome, it will be no different from the 
sequential voting process, i.e. Z; othenvise, the outcome of the 
logrolling process is unpredictable. Still, perhaps we can say 
something by considering briefly the dynamics of the logrolling 
process. 
Assume Z is not in equilibrium. 8 Then, Z is vulnerable 
to any winning coalition such that 
b, - ti l C, > 0 i jEW J 
IJ. E W 
l 
That is, any omnibus which yields positive net benefits to a majority 
of members defeats Z .  This "positive net benefits" requirement 
holds' only at the initial stage (the defeat of Z ) , however. Note 
that W itself is vulnerable to any cheaper winning coalition W1 
(larger or smaller) such that 
i E wnw• 
b. - t l c > -t l c. i ijEW' j ijEW J 
i E W1\W 
(2a) 
(2b) 
All members of W' must do better than they did when W was in existence. 
For members in the overlap, wnw•, this means a greater positive 
payoff than previously; but for members of W' who were not in W, 
the new payoff could simply be a smaller negative payoff than pre-
viously. 
That aside, it is clear that W is vulnerable to two 
general classes of coalitions: (1) any winning subset of itself 
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(because the subset will be a cheaper coalition); (2) the cheaper 
coalitions of its size. In particular, W will be vulnerable to 
the cheapest minimal winning subset of itself which in turn will 
be vulnerable to the cheapest of all minimal winning coalitions, 
}f, All of this is independent of the exact values of bi' ci, ti. 
Various authors stop at this point and identify Mc as the 
predicted outcome of distributive policymaking by majority rule.9 
But Kadane's theorem tells us that Mc itself is vulnerable. 
Implicitly analysts assume that all members of a winning coalition 
receive their project (i.e. 2a, 2b). That need be so only at the 
initial stage (the defeat of Z ) . One must also recognize the 
possibility of what might be termed "bribe coalitions" in which 
only some members receive projects, vis-a-vis the more standard 
"project coalitions" in which all members receive projects. 
Specifically, let the members of L\Mc bribe away the cheapest
member of Mc (call him d for defector). This they can do by 
offering to build only his project. The yield from this degenerate 
omnibus is 
- t,cd > -t, l C, l ljHfC J 
for d 
IJ. E L\Mc 
l 
While numerous bribe coalitions could defeat Mc, the above is 
uniquely preferred by all its members: it is the cheapest bribe 
coalition. 
Of course, any bribe coalition is immediately vulnerable 
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to Z (by a vote of t - 1: 1) as well as to various project coalitions. 
And the cycle continues. 
Thus, this brief look at the nature of the distributive 
policymaking cycle is not terribly illuminating. In terms of 
coalition size there are only two points from which anything is not 
possible in one step: 
(1) Z -+project coalition -+ any cheaper coali�ion -+ bribe 
coalition -+ anything 
(2) Mc-+ bribe coalition -+ anything. 
In terms of government expenditure the cycle is a bit simpler: 
0-+ l c. -+ l c. -+any amount < l c, 
j EW J j ED J j EL J 
where D is the set of defectors in a bribe coalition. That is, from 
Z we can predict that w > _& projects will be funded. From there 2 
majority rule leads to cheaper outcomes until a bribe coalition 
exists, from which point more expensive proposals can defeat less 
expensive ones. This dynamic may put one in mind of Sisyphus, but 
certainly not of universalism. 
Distributive Policymaking Under Procedure-Constrained Majority Rule 
No real world legislature mirrors the "anything goes" 
model examined in the preceding section. In most legislatures a 
body of rules constrains the proposals which the legislature might 
consider and by inplication the various coalitions which can form. 
The overall effect of such rules is generally to restrict the nature 
of legislative maneuvers to those which entail marginal or incre-
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mental changes from proposals under consideration. In this section 
we will impose a set of rules which brings a considerable degree of 
stability to the distributive arena. But in no way does this 
stability resemble universalism. 
Assume a specific model of coalition formation and change, 
a model which limits coalitions to the following: 
(1) Expulsion of a member. 
( 2 )  Addition o f  a member. 
(3)  Substitution of a new member for a previous one. 
These steps, however, may be continued indefinitely. 
Theorists will recognize the preceding constraints as a 
� rule (Luce, 1954) which limits the coalition formation/alteration 
process to one of marginal change. In the abstract these rules 
might seem arbitrary. But consider an institutional arrangement 
(what Shepsle, 1978,terms an amendment control process) which would 
generate something like those rules: a permissible amendment to 
an omnibus may propose to: 
(1) Strike a project. 
(2) Add a project. 
( 3 )  Substitute one project for another. 
This type of rule resembles those which often obtain in real world 
legislatures, including the rule under which public works omnibus 
bills are considered.lo 
Under the imposed rules Z is always in equilibrium. Thus, 
we assume that at the initial stage a subset (committee) of L is 
changed with the construction of an omnibus. That is, the committee 
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itself is unconstrained when formulating the initial omnibus for 
floor consideration. Because Z with 0 net benefits is the status
quo , or default o utcome, to have any possibility of accep tance the 
commit tee proposal mus t provide pos itive net benefits to a maj ority 
of members, includ ing presumably a maj ority of the committee . 1 1
Suppose that t h e  commit tee proposal includes w proj ec ts, where 
w > m .
How will the membership o f  L react t o  the commit tee propo-
sal? Given that they seek to maximize net benefits to their 
distr icts, it seems natural to suppose that they offer the permissible 
amendments which, if  passed, would accomplish that maximization . 
With this assump t ion the system becomes determinate . 
Consider first amendments which propose adding proj ects . 
Some members no t in the winning proj ect coalition might try to 
maximize their net benefits by proposing that their proj ect b e  
. .,, .. d 12 ap,,rove • No mat ter . All such amendments lose Q. - 1: 1 .  Thus , the 
committee proposal can never be expanded . 
Knowing the above, Q. - 1 legislators would seek to o ffer 
an amendment to cut the most expens ive proj ect from W, while the 
legislator who has the mos t  expensive proj ect would seek to o ffer 
an amendment to d elete the second most expensive proj ect in the 
omnibus . Either amendment would pass Q. - 1 :  1 .  
Given that all Q.
i 
who seek to maximize net benefits by 
proposing addition amendments will fail, while all who find i t  
rational to of fer deletion amendments will succeed , w e  conclude 
that the winning project coalit ion b ecomes both cheaper (as 
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previously) and smaller at each s tage . And in contrast to the 
unconstrained process ,  all members of the proj ect coalition receive 
positive ne t benefits . 
Eventually this process pares the original omnibus down 
from w projects to the cheapes t subset o f  m proj ects . At this 
point all legislators who maximize net benefits by o ffering fur ther 
deletion amendments are doomed to failure , because s trik ing one more 
project would reduce the omnibus to m - 1 projects, les s than a 
majority and a loser to the status quo , z.1
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Thus, legis lators 
would maximize net benefits by o ffering substitution amendments . 
Of these amendments Q. - 1 legislators would favor that which 
replaces the mos t  expensive member of M with the least expensive 
member of L\M : 
- t  I c < b  - t  I c 
ij EN j i ij EM' j 
i E Mf1M '  
i E M'\M 
where M' is a minimal winning project coalition cheaper than M, and 
different from M by one member . As before the most expens ive 
legislator would naturally rather s tr ike the second most expensive 
proj ect . Eventually the s ubstitution amendments produce }{. 14
Note that all members o f  M
c 
receive positive net benefits . 
The preceding analysis can be summarized by the 
following : 
Proposition. Under the specified ( i . e .  marginalis t )  rules , 
the omnibus representing M c is in equilibr ium: 
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(1) All expansion amendments fail 
l:.Q.-1. 
( 2 )  All deletion amendments fail ,Q,- m:m. 
( 3) All substitution amendments fail 
l:.Q.- 1. 
In Shepsle' s (1977) terminology the procedures imposed on 
the legislative process produce a new "structure induced equili-
brium," Mc. If the process has a "preference induced equilibrium," 
it is Z, which is also stable under our procedures, but it is 
achievable only if the originating committee proposes it, i.e. if 
the projects are so economically poor that no committee majority can 
construct an omnibus they prefer to Z. 
In sum, a model of distributive policymaking modified 
to reflect real legislative considerations banishes the unpredict-
ability inherent in unconstrained majority rule. But the modified 
model leads us away from rather than toward universalism. Minimal 
winning coalitions, and cheap ones at that, reign supreme in the 
modified model. 
Universalism as Long-Term Self-Interest 
We can safely conclude that intuitive expectations are 
correct: universalism is not compatible with myopic models of 
majority rule. Rather, universalism appears to be something which 
overrides the dynamics of majority rule. Various candidates for 
that "something" present themselves, including the always available 
2 2  
"impefect information." But the most compelling argument is that 
of Weingast (1978 ). 
Weingast relies on the notion of the "veil of ignorance" 
previously used by analysts of constitutional choice (e.g. Buchanan 
and Tullock). If legislators hope to remain legislators, and expect 
to propose projects as a means of doing so, and find it impossible 
to predict their long-term likelihood of success (i.e. cannot 
predict how often they will be proposing cheap projects), they may 
unanimously agree to forego the formation of cheap minimal winning 
coalitions. 
Recounting briefly, given a long series of omnibus bills 
the legislator under the veil of ignorance calculates that the 
b bili f b hi · 'fc 1' s i 1 ,Q, + 1 pro a ty o mem ers p in " approx mate y �
Thus, his expected value from a given omnibus is 
Under universalism, however, ,Q,i's expected value is 
( 3 ) 
b. - t. I c. C4)  i ij EL J 
It could well be the case that ( 4 )  > ( 3 ).  In Weingast's analysis 
bi= bj, ci = cj, ti= tj =t• Vi, j. Substituting in (4) and ( 3 ) we
see that all ,Q,i would prefer universalism to majority rule if b > c,
hardly a strong condition. Of course, one may object to Weingast's 
special assumptions but these can be relaxed somewhat. The equal 
benefits assumption is unnecessary. And if we allow ci f cj we can 
still derive an interpretable condition. In this case a legislator's 
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expec ted value given maj ority rule is less than that under univer-
salism if (subs t ituting in ( 3) and (4 ) ) , 
or 
where 
is the mean cos t  to each dis trict of the 
proj ects in �{.
is the mean cost to each d is trict of all 
the proj ects . 
For large 2 (6 ) says that universalism is preferable to maj ority 
rule i f  the average cost to the d is trict o f  building the extra 
proj ects is  less than half the benefits of the d is tric t ' s  proj ect . 
I f  benefits j us t  cover costs (6) demands something close to equal 
c,, whereas if benefit/ co s t  ratios are more favorable (6) can hold J 
even with considerable variation in the c
j
; the following examples 
illust rate the two cases : 
Example 1 .  bi c. \./. ]_ ]_
c
l 
c
2 
c3 c4 cs 
$3 $3 $4 $ 4  $4 
CL 
3 .6 
2 
CMc 
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, 2
2 
prefer maj ority rule; 23, 24 ' t5 
are ind ifferent . 
(5)  
(6) 
Example 2 .  b. I c. 
]_ ]_ 
$2 
3 
$3 
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$4 $5 $6 
4 
1 . 8  
All five legislators prefer universalism to majority 
rule. 
Of course, legislators operating under the veil of ignorance canno t 
very well be pred ic ting the cos t  dis tribution of proj ects. But 
(5) and the examples at leas t demons trate that rational legis lators 
may opt for universalism even when considerable variation in pro-
j ect cos t  is anticipated . 
It seems, then, that rational legislators with a long-
run perspective might form cooperative agreements to autho rize all 
proposed proj ects, or in short to agree to universalism as a "rule" 
o f  the dist ributive game . 
Weingas t ' s  theory is quite plausible, and it does suggest 
several roughly testable implications . For one, we would expect 
that universalism is more prevalent nm� than in nineteenth century 
Congresses, for modern legislators have certainly had greater 
aspirations for a long- term career than their nineteenth century 
predecessors . Legislators with a short-term career perspective 
would not appear well described by the veil of ignorance no tion, 
nor would they be likely to adhere to a universalism agreement if 
their immediate incentives conflicted with it .
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Another reason universalism as conceptualized by Weingas t 
migh t be more prevalent today than during earl ier periods has to do 
with the expansion o f  the distributive arena itself .  I f  the legis­
lature only approves irrigation proj ects, the veil of ignorance is 
no t so plausible : we all know who needs the biggest proj ects . But 
if the legislature approves the building of any kind o f  proj ects 
interest groups, bureaucrats and legislators can conceive, the veil 
o f  ignorance becomes more plaus ible . Thus, an expansion in the 
s cope of government distributive activity might s t imulate an 
expansion in the size of each separate activity . 
III . DISTRIBUTIVE POLICYMAKING : ON THE TRAIL OF RECIPROCITY 
To address reciprocity we need to complicate the simple 
model used thus far . Whereas we dealt in section II with an 
undifferentiated distributive arena ( e . g .  urban renewal and irri­
gation proj ects compete directly), we mus t now assume standing 
committees with fixed (at least in the short-run) j ur isdictions . 
While this might seem to complicate mat ters, the addi tional 
complexity is mos tly apparent . The conceptual investment already 
made enables us to construct a model of reciprocity agreements in 
reasonably short order . 
A S imple Commit tee System 
Assume L is partitioned into a set of commit tees, 
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C = (c 1,c 2
, . . .  ,Cc ) ! C l ..:_3, l ei ! < m, each of which h as exclusive 
j urisdiction over a given distributive activi ty, i . e .  the exclusive 
right to construct an omnibus proposing the authorization of pro­
j ects of a given nature ( e . g .  urban renew al, irrigation, federal 
buildings, military contracts, e tc . ) . The commit tees themselves 
operate by maj ority rule, and mus t secure a maj ority on the floor 
in o rder to upse t  Z. The only floor amendments in order are those 
which per tain to proj ects in a commi t tee ' s  j urisdiction . Such 
amendments are called germane . 
As mentioned previously d iscussions of reciprocity 
normally presuppose a nonrandom distribution of legislators across 
committees. Specifically, assume that legislators j oin one committee 
o f  their choi ce, 1
6 
and that they do so for electoral reasons . I 
w ill represent those reasons in a very simple way : each legislator 
has a proj ect in the j urisdiction of the commit tee he j o ins and 
none in the j urisdic tion of o ther committees . This is the classic 
case when congressmen advocate reciprocity : proposals affect o ther 
districts only by raising their tax burden.17
Given the rules the legisla ture opera t es under, all 
committees lose on the floo r .  B y  cons truction, a maj o ri ty of the 
legislators has no proj ect in the j urisdiction of each committee 
and thus cannot possibly receive posi tive net benefits from an 
omnibus . Thus, each committee proposal goes down, or alternatively, 
a succession o f  delection amendments passes until the proposed 
omnibus is amended to Z .  How might our committees escape this fate? 
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A S uper-Omnibus 
In part II we worked w ith the fact that although each 
legislator ' s  proposal would fail , an omnibus might pass . Formally , 
each ,11,
i 
proposes a degenerate omnibus with a single unit entry 
(signifying approval of his proj ect) and JI, - 1 zero entries
(signifying rej ec tion of all o ther proj ects . Any such degenerate 
omnibus loses to Z ,  an £-vector o{ zeros , But an appropriate JI,-
vector containing more ones than zeros (a winning p roj ect coalition) 
can defeat Z. 
Now we have the fact that each committee proposal will 
fail . Formally , each commit tee proposal is an £-vector w ith zeros 
for at  least a maj ority of the legislature (because le. I <  m) , but
}_ 
pos sibly with ones for some subset of the committee . Each such 
£-vector loses to Z .  But , following the analogy of part I I ,  can 
two o r  more o f  the commit tee proposals combined as a super-omnibus , 
defeat Z? Yes obviously. Rather than coalitions of individual 
legislators we now have coalitions of legislators o rganized in 
commit tees , but the task remains the same : to agree to report a 
super-omnibus whi ch provides posit ive net benefits to a maj ority 
of the l egislature and can thus defeat Z. And this task proceeds 
in light o f  the knowledge that any such agreement w ill be s ubj ect 
to floor assault s . Can we predict anything about the nature of 
the proposed super-omnibus? The question poses difficult ies . 
In the first place the committee coalitions are not 
predictable--our rules of coalition formation are not imposed within 
the commit tees where the omnibus bills are put together . At the 
comm i t tee s tage we have uncons trained maj ority rule . 
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In the second place the same is true of the intercommittee 
bargaining . Even if a majority of each committee somehow managed 
to agree on a propos al, such agreements could be upset at the next 
stage . One or more committee coalitions might find that some 
proj ects in its j urisdiction which have no t been authorized are 
cheaper than proj ects authorized by the winning proj ect coalitions 
of o ther commit tees . And this opens the doors o f  ins tability . 
Supporters of a tentative super-omnibus might seek to expand cheaper 
commit tee winning proj ect coalitions and contract more expensive 
ones. In fact , commit tees could be forced to authorize the proj ects 
o f  a maj ority o f  their cheaper members in order to forestall the 
authorization of a l ike number of more expensive proj ects in o ther 
commi ttees . In sum ,  anything becomes possible . At the level of 
nego tiating the super-omnibus , we have unconstrained maj o rity rule . 
Jus t as it is theoretically impossible to specify what emerges from 
each commi t tee , so it  is impossible to predict the change in 
commi ttee proposals which emerges from intercommittee nego tiations . 
Myopia is a useful assump tion , but perhaps we have pushed 
it too far here . Each legislator knows that failure to agree upon 
a super-omnibus representing a winning proj ect coalition w ill result 
in zero benefits to his district . Z will be the legislative out-
come . Moreove r ,  bribe coalitions are surely doub tful . The minority 
of legislators receiving proj ects mus t be aware that a maj o rity has 
the incentive to gut such a super-omnibus on the floor. Bribe 
coalitions might play a role in the nego tiations but it is completely 
futile to accept them as the outcome of those negotiations. Failure 
to agree , agreement on a bribe coalition and agreement on Z all
mean the same thing : Z. 
By the same token legislators can make certain types 
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of predictions about the floor fate of a s uper-omnibus representing 
a winning proj ect coalition. All proposed additions to such a 
s uper-omnibus will fail , of cours e ,  for the same reason as 
before . A maj ority would have the incentive , howeve r ,  to pass 
deletion amendments to wipe-out any extraneous member s ,  s tarting 
w ith the most expensive . S imilarly , a maj o ri ty would have the 
incentive to substitute cheaper for more expens ive members of 
the proj ect coalition , as before . In short , a floor maj ority 
has the incentive to reduce any proposed super-omnibus representing 
a project  coalition to something similar to the familiar �{ . 18
Why not , then , j us t  eliminate aJl the fuss and propose the latter? 
Here the committee system creates a catch in the 
proceedings . The super-omnibus which represents J'{ could well
involve only the proj ects o f  a minority of members of some 
commit tees . In such a case the maj ority of the committee antici­
pates negative net benefits from the super-omnibus and would 
therefore refuse to report the committee omnibus involving a 
minority of their colleagues : Z is preferred to J'{ by a minority , 
but that minority may include committee maj orities whose cooperation 
is neces sary to form M
c
. 
A second-best  possibility would be a super-omnibus 
representing the cheapest possible minimal winning coalition 
composed entirely of committee winning proj ect coalitions . 19  As 
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before , all addition amendments receive only one vo te . A maj ority 
opposes all deletion amendments because the coalition is minimal . 
And no substitution amendments pass because the coalition is already 
the cheapest practical (i . e .  meeting the constraint that it be 
composed of commit tee maj orities ) .  
Enough. The preceding somewhat tedious account makes 
the point . Introduction of commit tees w ith associated j uris dictions 
detracts significantly from the s tability produced by the amendment 
control process in part II . The cheaper minimal winning coalitions 
s till have some s ignificance , but there appears to be a much 
greater likelihood that the sys tem will s imply bog down, no agree­
ment on a super-omnibus will resul t ,  and Z will emerge by default . 
When the legislature operates as a commit tee of the whol e  at least 
51  percent o f  the legislators could count on success . Given 
committees endowed with meaningful power ( j urisdictions) 51 
percent of the legislators might hope for succes s ,  but 0 percent 
might achieve it. A theory of reciprocity is fairly obvious at 
this point. 
Reciprocity as the Means to Universalism in a Decentralized Legislature 
In part II we saw that with the legislature operating as 
a commit tee of the whole , legislators w ith a long-term perspective 
might look favorably on universalism agreements .  The  l atter can 
result in higher long-run benefits to the district than maj ority 
rule. I trust it is noncontroversial to point out that universalism 
agreements become even more tempting as the attractiveness of the 
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alternative decreases . We have j ust seen that in a legislature 
operating under a committee system, legislators expect either to 
be in a minimal w inning coalit ion not generally the same as Mc 
( i . e .  one having lower net benefits) or to receive zero net 
benefit s  as the process stalemates and results in Z. 
Looking at the long-term, suppose that the legislator 
estimates that a minimal w inning coalit ion w il l  form w ith 
probability, pi, and that stalemate will result w ith probability , 
(1 - p i) .  Resorting to the veil of ignorance again , a legislator 
expect s  the following payoff in a legislat ure operating w ith a 
committee system ( assume t
i
= tj = 1/2) : 
Comparing (7) w ith the left-hand side of ( 5 )  we see that so long as 
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pi < 1, (7) will b e  less . In short, anytime universalism is
attractive to legislators in an undifferentiated legislature, it 
will be even more attractive to the same legisl ators in a legis-
lature different i ated into committees which control specific 
j urisdict ions . 
But what are w e  doing t alking of universalism in a section 
devoted to reciprocity? Quite simple , reciprocity is merely a 
means to universalism in a differentiated legisl ature . Assuming 
that legislators in the latter w ish to operate under universalism, 
how do they go about doing so? Within committee they can agree t o  
universalism directly, a s  before . The members o f  each committee 
makes an agreement to include the proj ects of all memb ers in their 
(7) 
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proposal . But given that the committees contain minorit ies o f  the 
legis lature, w ithin-committee agreements are not enough; agreements 
b etween committees are also necessary . Each committee agrees to 
keep hands off the propos als of other committees. That is exactly 
reciprocity, but it is no more than a precondition of universalism . 
Given the committee system universalism can be achieved only by a 
combination o f  w ithin-committee and between-committee agreements . 
Matthews '  failure to distinguish clearly between universalism and 
r eciprocity was probably less a confusion than a recognition that 
the two are inextricably connected . 
A Meta-Theoretical Inconsistency? 
The argument that universalism and reciprocit y  are allied 
agreements entered into by legislators intent on maximiz ing net 
benefits to their district s  rests on the notion of the veil o f  
ignorance : legislators cannot predict a priori the costliness of 
their proj ects and thus their likelihood o f  being members o f  the 
cheap minimal winning coalit ions which are the expected outcome 
under maj ority rule . Yet at the same time we as sume that 
legislators j oin specific committees because they know their 
proj ects w ill lie within the j urisdictions o f  those committees . 
Does this supposition contradict the assumed veil of ignorance? I 
don ' t  really think so . 
In the first place w ithin each committee (i . e .  among 
proj ects in each class )  the veil of ignorance is st ill plausib l e .  
Perhaps irrigation proj ects are t h e  raison d ' etre f o r  t h e  members 
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o f  only one commit tee , but among tha t s ubset , who can s ay how
expensive one ' s  proj ects w ill be vis-a-vis one ' s  fellow commi ttee 
members 1? Thus , a legislator will b e  highly uncertain about his 
chances o f  being in the commit tee winning coalition . 
In the second place ,  we have s een that the intercommit tee 
bargaining is quite fluid . Some theoris ts might deny tha t i t  even 
has as much structure as I claim for it . Certainly , though , even 
those members in commit tee winning coalitions will be very uncertain 
about their chances of being included in the intercommit tee agree­
ments. Who can say whether the cheaper urban renewal proj ects will 
be more or less expensive than the cheap w ater proj ects ten years 
down the road , and how both will stack up against cheap proj cts 
of some o ther committee? 
Thus , the additional knowledge assumpt ion entailed by 
the committee system does not appear to contradict the overall veil 
of ignorance notion whi ch drives the analysis . P erhaps the periodic 
pressures to reorganize commit tee systems so as to p rovide the 
committees with j urisdictions approximately equal in importance 
reflects the effort to protect the veil of ignorance --
univers alism and reciprocity agreements are easier to maintain under 
such conditions than when some committees know they deal in 
cheaper s ubstance and therefore s tand a bet ter than even chance of 
entering minimal w inning coalitions . 
IV . ADDITIONAL FACTORS WHICH FACILITATE UNIVERSALISM AND 
RECIPROCITY ARRANGmffiNTS 
Misperception of Benef its and Cos ts 
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We have discussed a theory o f  universalism and reciprocity 
arrangements based on uncertainty about future o utcomes . The theory 
makes no appeal to misperception of the benefits and cos ts, 
Rather,  we assume that legislators faithfully a ttempt to maximize 
the net benefits of distributive policymaking to their district s .  
I t  is evident , howeve r ,  that various types o f  mispercep tion can make 
the adop tion of universalism and reciprocity arrangements more likely . 
Consider condition (6) . I f  const ituents overestimate 
the b enefit s , underestimate the costs , or both , univers alism agree­
ments become more likely . As Mayhew ( 19 74 )  argues, congressmen make 
every effort to acquaint cons tituents with the formers ' efforts in 
their behalf; moreover , congressmen favor those activities which 
are highly visible in their impact ( i . e .  cons truction, with its 
evident use of local labor and materials) . Yet reasonably obj ective 
observers have raised doubts about the actual benefits o f  various 
dis tributive activi ties (Ferej ohn on water proj ec ts; Anagnoson 
( 1 9 7 7 )  on EDA p roj ects and HUD water and sewer grants; Gramlich 
(1978)  on the employment impact of public works programs ) . 
On the cos t side we have the well-known problem of fiscal 
illusion (Goe t z , 1 9 7 7; Wagner , 1976 ) . I f  proj ect expenses are 
systematically underestimated and/or recouped in s uch a way that 
constituents underestimate true cos ts (e . g .  through income taxes 
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rather than user charges), (6) s tates that universalism agreements 
become more likely . Thus , fiscal illusion encourages legislators 
to forsake maj ority rule for universalism, with its consequent 
excessive level of dis tributive activity . 
Divergence of Legislator and District Benefits 
Throughout p ar ts II and III we assumed tha t legislators 
faith fully maximize net benefits to their dis tricts albeit as a 
means to their own reelection . In the preceding section , however , 
we recognized that cons tituents might not calculate ne t benefits 
accurately , and asserted that legislators might maximize perceived 
net benefits rather than actual. If we presume that legislators 
do not make the s ame perceptual errors const ituents do , the preceding 
asser tion requires that we recognize the divergence between 
legislator and district benefits . 
If legislators maximize the appearance of net benefits 
then they have a positive incent ive to overes timate proj ect 
b enefits and to encourage fiscal illus ion . No doubt the typical 
legislator's oppos ition to good policy analyses (" the benefit s  of 
my program can' t be quantified" ) ,  tax indexin g ,  user changes , 
e t c .  is multifaceted . But perhaps at least part of i t  is that 
s uch devices make the legislator's life easier by facilitating 
universalism and reciprocity : the lat ter make the appearance of 
pos itive net benefits more likely than the actuality o f  zero 
b enefits , although his district might be better off under the 
latter . 
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The Dis tributive Tendency 
The conclusions in this paper apply only to the dis tribu­
tive arena . As we mentioned in the introduction , univers alism and 
reciprocity are mos t  obvious in that aren a .  Few committees and 
few bills deal solely with dis tributive policy , however; and some 
degree of reciprocity is accorded to commit tees in all but the 
most heated battles over regulatory and redis tributive policy or 
except in the case of " rogue" commit tees (e . g .  Post Office and 
Civil Service,  D . C . ? )  Can w e  explain this wider incidence o f  
unversalism and reciprocity? 
Ripley and Franklin (1976)  have argued that a primary 
s trategy for passing regulatory or redistributive legislation is 
to infuse it with suffi cient distributive elements that opponents 
are bought o f f .  As examples they suggest the Model Cities Act o f  
1966, the Federal Aid t o  Education Act of 196 5 ,  and o thers (see 
also Dommel ,  19 75, on urban programs ) . In his discussion of the 
Social Pork B arre l ,  S tockman ( 1 9 7 5 )  concurs with Ripley and 
Franklin and argues tha t  the process of particularizing ostensibly 
general legislation continues a fter the legislation is a dopted 
(e. g .  the vo te on House passage of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 was 26 3-1 5 3; by 1974 the vote on reauthori­
za tion had swelled to 380-26) . Universalism and reciprocity may 
be so widespread simply because dis tribut ive politics is more 
pervas ive than we reali ze . 
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A final comment here. Policy analys ts often no te the tendency 
of legislators to choose inefficient means to achieve public policy 
ends (e . g .  water treatment plants rather than tax/subsidy schemes , 
education grants rather than vouchers , etc. ) . Elsewhere Noll and 
I (1978a , b )  have theorized about the basis of this "inefficiency 
tendency" ( the dis tributive tendency by another name ) .  Combining 
those earlier conclusions with the ones in this paper s uggests 
that legislators ' s elf-interest leads them to prefer not only 
inefficient policy ins truments , but excessive usage of those 
instruments . 
V .  CONCLUSION : EMPIRICAL PROPOSIT IONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Following the example of e conomis ts , s tudents o f  political 
economy often conc lude theoretical p ap ers by summarizing their 
theoretical r es ul ts , i.e .  speculations . 1Vhile sometimes guilty 
of that prac t ic e , I will eschew it  here and conclude by sugges ting 
some tes table propositions which might provide a real world anchor 
for the theory of universalism and reciprocity discussed herein. 
In part II I s ugges ted a very general proposition: 
P - 1 :  Universalism is more prevalent in today's Congress 
than in the nineteenth c entury forerunners . 
Recall that this proposition rested on the no tions that (1) today ' s  
career legislators have longer time horizons than their amateur 
predecessors; (2) the greater the diversity of the dis tributive 
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arena (i . e. s cope of government) the more plausible is the veil o f  
ignorance. Both considerations contribute t o  the adop tion o f  
universalism . P - 1 brings our argument full c ircle : universalism 
is a cons equence of an increasing scope of government and a cause of 
increasing size . 
Several additional proposi tions follow from an examination 
of ( 3 ) - (6 )  from the s tandpoint of the individual legis lator . If 
for some reason particular legislators do no t feel they need to 
operate under the veil of ignorance , predictable subse ts may oppose 
universalism and reciprocity . Specifically , 
P - 2: Legislators who expec t their districts to want no 
proj ects will certainly oppose universalism and 
reciprocity . 
P- 3: Legislators who expec t to propose p roj ec ts with 
lowest benefits are most likely to oppose 
universalism and reciprocity. 
P - 4 : Legislators whos e  dis tricts have the highes t 
tax shares are mos t  likely to oppose universalism 
and reciprocity. 
Additionally , a legis lator who expects his probability of being in 
a minimal winning coali tion to be greater than 9, + 1/29, should be
less at trac ted to universalism, ceteris paribus . Therefor e ,  
P - 5: Legislators who expect to propose the cheap est  
proj ects are the  mos t  likely to  oppose univer­
salism and reciprocity . 
When coupled with known empir ical associations propositions 2-5 
sugges t a derivative implica tion : 
P - 6 :  Republicans are more likely than Democrats to 
1 d . . t 21oppose universa ism an reciproci y .  
Finally , consider (7 ) . I f  legislators form their es timates of 
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legislative s talemate, (1 - pi )' based on pas t experiences , ( 7 )  s ugges ts 
the fo llowing proposition which might be t ested either temporally 
or cross-culturally : 
P - 7 :  Ceteris paribus legislatures which experience 
his tories of legis lative s talemate are more 
likely to adop t universalism and reciprocity 
than those in which maj orities accomplish posi-
tive legislative actions . In particular, 
differentiated legisla tures ( i . e .  those with 
strong commit tee systems ) are more likely to 
adopt  universalism than undifferentiated 
legis latures . 
Although the causes of government growth are many and 
complex ; legislative adherence to universalism and reciprocity is 
s urely a contributing factor . The U . S .  Congress with its career 
legislators , its rich , variegated and contagious dis tributive 
politics , and its highly differen tiated commit tee sys tem provides 
a conducive climate for the universalism and reciprocity practices 
on which government thrives . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  In a s trangely one-sided treatment Downs ignores the possibility 
that imperfect information might a lso generate countervailing 
factors s uch as fiscal illus ion (Wagner , 1976; Goetz ,  1977) . 
2 .  One should recognize , however , tha t  these negative theorems 
are "possibility" results : they identify features of maj ority 
rule but do no t necessarily predict tha t  such features will be 
realized . Work is only now commencing on "probability" results : 
specification of which outcomes among the limitless possibilities 
are likely to occur . Along these l ines Ferej ohn , Fiorina and 
Packel (1978)  have proposed a model which produces results 
reminiscent of earlier speculations by Tullock (1967 ) . 
3 . Though not explicit on the mat ter , Lowi ' s  scheme appears mos t 
applicable to domes tic policy . 
4. The reader might wish to compare Lowi ' s  distinctions with those in 
Buchanan and Tullock (196 2 ) , chapter 11 . 
5 .  I t  is commonly obj ec ted tha t the enhanced freedom o f  those 
redis tributed to more than balances out the diminished freedom 
of their benefactors . Even if we concede the point ( though I 
4 1  
suspect many here would regard it  a s  nonsensical) it  does not 
alter the fact that even "desirable" or "j us t ifiable" 
redis tributions require an increase in the intrusive�ess o f  
government .  
6 .  Howver ,  i f  we measure size s imply by the to tal o f  government 
expenditures or revenues (vis-a-vis employment or payroll s ) , 
then redis tribution necessarily increases size of government . 
7 .  Separability and single-peakedness are clearly satisfied in this 
context .  All legislators have binary preferences over pro-
j ects : they favor their own and oppose all o thers . Thus , 
s ingle-peakedness is trivial . Separability also is obvious . 
Whatever the pattern of proj ect approvals and disapprovals in 
an omnibus , a legislator favors any one proposal change which 
happens to be an authorization for his proj ect or a deauthori-
zation fo� anyone else ' s  proj ect , and opposes any one-proposal 
change which happens to be an authorization of someone els e ' s  
proj ect , or a deauthorization o f  his proj ect .  
8 .  Z will be in equilibrium if b i < ti 
L c ,  for some i EM, ll M. In 
j EM J 
this case no winning coalit ion could find an omnibus each 
member could s uppor t .  Intuitively , the case corresponds to 
one in which all the proposed proj ects are real dogs . 
9 .  Or j us t  any M if the authors assume that bi 
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\li , j  (e . g .  Weingas t ,  1 9 7 8) . We should point out that Riker 
(1962 ) , who has studied minimal winning coalitions mos t  
extensively would not necessarily predict M in this case : 
dis tributive politics is not in general a zero-sum game . 
10 . Par t ( 3) of the rule is the only part which differs from the 
rule which the U . S .  House generally uses (although proposals 
to alter the funding level o f  a proj ect are in effect , subs ti-
tutes) but this is the leas t important part for our analys is . 
See below , footnote 1 4 . 
11. As will become evident no thing more needs to be assumed about
12. 
the committee . What they propose is irrelevant so long as it
represents an omnibus for a winning proj ect coalition . In fact , 
current work with Ferejohn sugges ts that the autho rizing committee
is theoretically unnecess ary . Sophisticated voting in committee
of the whole under the addition and deletion rules will lead a 
maj ority to build up from Z to �f,
No te that depending on the values of bi ' ti
, and cj E W  some non­
members o f  the proj ect coali tion might find that it is more 
efficacious to offer an amendment to delete the mos t  expensive 
cj rather than include their own proj ec t .  
1 3 .  This i s  implicitly a sophis ticated voting argument--unadulterated 
myopia would lead legislators to pass success ive dele tion 
4 3  
amendments until Z was achieved . In the aforementioned work with 
Ferejohn we show that sophisticated legislators will defeat 
further deletion amendmen ts once M is achieved . 
1 4 .  If our amendmen t control process did no t permit substi tution 
proposals , the omnibus would simply be pared down to its 
' cheapest  m proj ects . The coalition 1{ supporting this omnibus
would in general be more expens ive than M
c . 
15 . Interest ingly , though , if legislators were concerned with
maximizing net benefits to the dis trict as an end in itself , 
rather than as a means of p rolonging their own careers , their 
time p erspective would make no difference : even the one-termer 
migh t adhere to universalism rather than j oin a M which would 
provide greater immediate benefits . 
1 6 .  For evidence that this i s  a reasonably plausible assumption see 
Ger tzog (1976)  and Rohde and Shepsle (197 3) .
17 . To digress for a moment about a sugges tion arising from empirical 
studies , an increase in the tax burden of one ' s  dis trict is 
apparently insufficient to qualify a congressman as having a 
direct interes t in a given piece of legislation . In the 
redis tributive and regulatory arenas legislators representing 
the " re dis tributed from" and "regulatees" respec tively , are 
considered legi timate opponents of legis lation . But in the 
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dis tributive arena � opposi tion seems tinged with illegi timacy . 
Probably this s i tuation reflec ts the failure of modern Congresses 
to recognize the concep t of a budge t cons traint . In its absence 
dis tributive proj ects appear noncompeti tive . While the recently 
adopted Budge t Process recognizes a cons traint in principle , 
it remains to be seen whether the constraint is truly binding . 
1 8 .  I t  would not generally b e  the same a s  Uc becaus e o f  the 
19 . 
commi ttee sys tem and germaness rule . The lat ter limits the 
types of sub s ti tution amendments which could be offered . Thus 
the minimal winning coalitions of the decentrali�ed process 
would typically be more expensive than those generated by the 
commi ttee of the whole . 
Notice that this s econd bes t coalition could involve a minority 
of commi ttee maj orities . We have not ass umed that the committees 
are of equal size , nor have we excluded larger than minimal 
committee coalitions , so long as they are cheaper than alterna-
tive minimal committee coalitions . 
20 · So long as N f Mc (7) will be less than the lef t-hand s ide of
(S)  even when p = 1 .
21 . Recall Mayhew ' s  (196 6 )  finding that congressional Republicans 
practice "exclusive" compromise whereas their Democratic 
counterparts prac tice "inc;;lusive" compromise . 
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